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分类： Android平台
2015-12-10 13:00:10
每个秘钥需要两个文件：扩展名为.x509.pem的证书（公钥）和扩展名为.pk8私钥。私钥是用来对包进行签名的，不可公开，而且有必要使用一定策略的密码进行保护，仅仅是让最终发布版本的人知道密码即可。而证书（公钥）相对来说要求并没有那么严格，它通常被用来验证一个包是否进行过密钥签名。
标准的Android通常使用下面4个秘钥，它们位于build/target/product/security目录下：
testkey
默认生成的更新包秘钥，如果我们在制作更新包时没有指定响应的秘钥，系统会默认使用testkey进行签名。
platform
平台使用的测试秘钥
shared
联系人等共享测试秘钥
media
部分多媒体、下载系统等程序包所使用的测试秘钥
我们可以在我们的.mk文件中通过设置LOCAL_CERTIFICATE来为我们的安装包指定秘钥（如果没有指定有效的key，系统会默认使用testkey）。
Device/yoyodyne/apps/SpecialApp/Android.mk
[...]
LOCAL_CERTIFICATE := device/yoyodyne/security/special
通过上面的配置，编译系统就会使用device/yoyodyne/security/special.{.509.pem,pk8}来为我们的应用进行签名。编译系统只能是用没有密码保护的私钥。
我们可以使用openssl工具来生成我们的秘钥（公钥和私钥），openssl工具下载地址：
# generate RSA key
% openssl genrsa -3 -out temp.pem 2048
Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
....+++
.....................+++
e is 3 (0x3)
# create a certificate with the public part of the key
% openssl req -new -x509 -key temp.pem -out releasekey.x509.pem \
-days 10000 \
-subj '/C=US/ST=California/L=San Narciso/O=Yoyodyne, Inc./OU=Yoyodyne Mobility/CN=Yoyodyne/emailAddress=yoyodyne@example.com'
# create a PKCS#8-formatted version of the private key
% openssl pkcs8 -in temp.pem -topk8 -outform DER -out releasekey.pk8 -nocrypt
# securely delete the temp.pem file
% shred --remove temp.pem
Openssl的pkcs8命令会生成一个没有密码保护的.pk8文件，这种方式适用于编译系统。如果想生成一个带有密码保护的.pk8文件，我们可以使用-passout stdin参数代替nocrypt参数即可。具体可参考docs/apps/openssl.html#PASS_PHRASE_ARGUMENTS。
我们可以使用sign_target_files_apks脚本来对.apk文件进行签名。当我们运行该脚本时，我们需要在命令行中使用”-k src_key=dest_key来指定相应的key。我们也可以使用-d dir来制定一个目录用来替换编译系统所使用的build/target/product/security目录，这就相当于下面这种用法：
例如在tardis项目中，使用了5个具有密码保护的秘钥：4个用来替换build/target/product/security，一个用来替换上面提到的keydevice/yoyodyne/security/special，如下：
然后我们可以像下面的例子中描述的一样对所有的应用进行签名：
签名OTA包的流程主要有下面这些：
1.准备好build时所要使用的签名文件
2.对准备创建的ota包进行签名
具体命令如下：
侧面安装机制并不能绕开安装包签名机制而进行。在安装更新前，recovery会对更新包的签名进行验证，它会验证OTA包签名的私钥是否和recovery分区存放的公钥相符。
对更新包签名的验证通常会有两次，一次是android系统使用Android API中的RecoverySystem.verifyPackage()方法进行验证，一种是recovery系统的验证。RecoverySystem API会检查存储在Android系统中的公钥是否与/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip(默认情况下)。而recovery 系统会验证存储在recovery 分区中的/res/keys中存储的公钥。
一般情况下，两个地方存储的公钥是相同的。在侧面安装机制中我们可以指定额外的key进行校验，通过下面的配置。
vendor/yoyodyne/tardis/products/tardis.mk
原文如下：
Android uses cryptographic signatures in two places:
Each key comes in two files: the certificate, which has the extension .x509.pem, and the private key, which has the extension .pk8. The private key should be kept secret and is needed to sign a package. The key may itself be protected by a password—a reasonable strategy is to store your keys in source control along with the code—but keep them protected by a password known only to the people who make final releases. The certificate, in contrast, contains only the public half of the key, so it can be distributed widely. It is used to verify a package has been signed by the corresponding private key.
The standard Android build uses four keys, all of which reside in build/target/product/security:
testkey Generic default key for packages that do not otherwise specify a key. platform Test key for packages that are part of the core platform. shared Test key for things that are shared in the home/contacts process. media Test key for packages that are part of the media/download system.Individual packages specify one of these keys by setting LOCAL_CERTIFICATE in their Android.mk file. (testkey is used if this variable is not set.) You can also specify an entirely different key by pathname, e.g.:
device/yoyodyne/apps/SpecialApp/Android.mk
[...] LOCAL_CERTIFICATE := device/yoyodyne/security/special
Now the build uses the device/yoyodyne/security/special.{x509.pem,pk8} key to sign SpecialApp.apk. The build can use only private keys that are not password protected.
Android uses 2048-bit RSA keys with public exponent 3. You can generate certificate/private key pairs using the openssl tool from :
# generate RSA key % openssl genrsa -3 -out temp.pem 2048 Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus ....+++ .....................+++ e is 3 (0x3) # create a certificate with the public part of the key % openssl req -new -x509 -key temp.pem -out releasekey.x509.pem \ -days 10000 \ -subj '/C=US/ST=California/L=San Narciso/O=Yoyodyne, Inc./OU=Yoyodyne Mobility/CN=Yoyodyne/emailAddress=yoyodyne@example.com' # create a PKCS#8-formatted version of the private key % openssl pkcs8 -in temp.pem -topk8 -outform DER -out releasekey.pk8 -nocrypt # securely delete the temp.pem file % shred --remove temp.pem
The openssl pkcs8 command given above creates a .pk8 file with no password, suitable for use with the build system. To create a .pk8 secured with a password (which you should do for all actual release keys), replace the -nocrypt argument with -passout stdin; then openssl will encrypt the private key with a password read from standard input. No prompt is printed, so if stdin is the terminal the program will appear to hang when it's really just waiting for you to enter a password. Other values can be used for the-passout argument to read the password from other locations; for details, see the openssl documentation.
The temp.pem intermediate file contains the private key without any kind of password protection, so dispose of it thoughtfully when generating release keys. In particular, the GNUshred utility may not be effective on network or journaled filesystems. You can use a working directory located in a RAM disk (such as a tmpfs partition) when generating keys to ensure the intermediates are not inadvertently exposed.
The first step in preparing a build for release is to sign all the .apk files in it, replacing the test keys used by the build system. This is done with the sign_target_files_apks script. It takes a target-files .zip as input and produces a new target-files .zip in which all the .apks have been signed with new keys.
When you run this script, you must specify on the command line a replacement key for each key used in the build. The -k src_key= dest_key flag specifies key replacements one at a time. The flag -d dir lets you specify a directory with four keys to replace all those in build/target/product/security; it is equivalent to using -k four times to specify the mappings:
build/target/product/security/testkey = dir/releasekey build/target/product/security/platform = dir/platform build/target/product/security/shared = dir/shared build/target/product/security/media = dir/media
For the hypothetical tardis product, you need five password-protected keys: four to replace the four inbuild/target/product/security, and one to replace the additional keydevice/yoyodyne/security/specialrequired by SpecialApp in the example above. If the keys were in the following files:
vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/releasekey.x509.pem vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/releasekey.pk8 vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/platform.x509.pem vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/platform.pk8 vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/shared.x509.pem vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/shared.pk8 vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/media.x509.pem vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/media.pk8 vendor/yoyodyne/security/special.x509.pem vendor/yoyodyne/security/special.pk8 # NOT password protected vendor/yoyodyne/security/special-release.x509.pem vendor/yoyodyne/security/special-release.pk8 # password protected
Then you would sign all the apps like this:
% ./build/tools/releasetools/sign_target_files_apks \ -d vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis \ -k vendor/yoyodyne/special=vendor/yoyodyne/special-release \ -o \ # explained in the next section tardis-target_files.zip signed-tardis-target_files.zip Enter password for vendor/yoyodyne/security/special-release key> Enter password for vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/media key> Enter password for vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/platform key> Enter password for vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/releasekey key> Enter password for vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/shared key> signing: Phone.apk (vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/platform) signing: Camera.apk (vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/media) signing: Special.apk (vendor/yoyodyne/security/special-release) signing: Email.apk (vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/releasekey) [...] signing: ContactsProvider.apk (vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/shared) signing: Launcher.apk (vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/shared) rewriting SYSTEM/build.prop: replace: ro.build.description=tardis-user Eclair ERC91 15449 test-keys with: ro.build.description=tardis-user Eclair ERC91 15449 release-keys replace: ro.build.fingerprint=generic/tardis/tardis/tardis:Eclair/ERC91/15449:user/test-keys with: ro.build.fingerprint=generic/tardis/tardis/tardis:Eclair/ERC91/15449:user/release-keys signing: framework-res.apk (vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/platform) rewriting RECOVERY/RAMDISK/default.prop: replace: ro.build.description=tardis-user Eclair ERC91 15449 test-keys with: ro.build.description=tardis-user Eclair ERC91 15449 release-keys replace: ro.build.fingerprint=generic/tardis/tardis/tardis:Eclair/ERC91/15449:user/test-keys with: ro.build.fingerprint=generic/tardis/tardis/tardis:Eclair/ERC91/15449:user/release-keys using: vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/releasekey.x509.pem for OTA package verification done.
After prompting the user for passwords for all password-protected keys, the script re-signs all the .apk files in the input target .zip with the release keys. Before running the command, you can also set the ANDROID_PW_FILE environment variable to a temporary filename; the script then invokes your editor to allow you to enter passwords for all keys (this may be a more convenient way to enter passwords).
sign_target_files_apks also rewrites the build description and fingerprint in the build properties files to reflect the fact that this is a signed build. The -t flag can control what edits are made to the fingerprint. Run the script with -h to see documentation on all flags.
You need the following components to sign OTA packages:
To achieve these components:
% ./build/tools/releasetools/ota_from_target_files \ -k vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/releasekey \ signed-tardis-target_files.zip \ signed-ota_update.zip unzipping target target-files... (using device-specific extensions from target_files) Enter password for vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/releasekey key> done.
Sideloading does not bypass recovery's normal package signature verification mechanism—before installing a package, recovery will verify that it is signed with one of the private keys matching the public keys stored in the recovery partition, just as it would for a package delivered over-the-air.
Update packages received from the main system are typically verified twice: once by the main system, using theRecoverySystem. verifyPackage() method in the android API, and then again by recovery. The RecoverySystem API checks the signature against public keys stored in the main system, in the file/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip (by default). Recovery checks the signature against public keys stored in the recovery partition RAM disk, in the file /res/keys.
Normally these two locations store the same set of keys. By adding a key to just the recovery set of keys, it's possible to sign packages that can be installed only via sideloading (assuming the main system's update download mechanism is correctly doing verification against otacerts.zip). You can specify extra keys to be included only in recovery by setting the PRODUCT_EXTRA_RECOVERY_KEYS variable in your product definition:
vendor/yoyodyne/tardis/products/tardis.mk
[...] PRODUCT_EXTRA_RECOVERY_KEYS := vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/sideload
This includes the public key vendor/yoyodyne/security/tardis/sideload. x509.pem in the recovery keys file so it can install packages signed with it. The extra key is not included in otacerts.zip though, so systems that correctly verify downloaded packages do not invoke recovery for packages signed with this key.
