Lawyers expose pressure to give green light for war

Lawyers expose pressure to give green light for war While Jack Straw, then foreign secretary, was roundly dismissing the unanimous advice of his top lawyers that an invasion of Iraq would be illegal, officials in Downing Street were strongly resisting similar unwelcome advice, this time from Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general.

Previously classified documents released today at the Chilcot inquiry offer a rare, perhaps unprecedented, insight into manoeuvring at the heart of government about one of the most serious issues to confront ministers – whether to go to war, and the lawfulness of it.

The documents reveal Goldsmith expressed concern to Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, that he was said to have had an "optimistic view" of the legality of an invasion without fresh UN backing. Goldsmith made it clear that was not his view. That was in November 2002 when Goldsmith had been struggling to get his voice heard, the inquiry was told. "Was the attorney general discouraged from giving advice?" David Brummell, the former attorney's legal secretary was asked. "Yes," Brummell replied.

When Blair finally asked Goldsmith for his formal legal advice, it came very late, on 7 March 2003, less than two weeks before the invasion. Goldsmith, who had originally shared the view of top Foreign Office lawyers christmas wreath that a fresh UN resolution was essential, now told Blair that an invasion without one would still carry risks but the government might get away with it.

But over the next 10 days Goldsmith was under pressure to come up with clear "unequivocal" advice, not least from Lord Boyce, chief of the defence staff.

The inquiry heard how Brummell asked Downing Street for an assurance to give to the head of the armed forces that an invasion would indeed be lawful without a new UN resolution.

Sir Roderic Lyne, an inquiry panel member, asked why an assessment that Iraq was still in breach of its disarmament obligations – a decision that would trigger an invasion – could be made by the prime minister when the legal advice up to then had been that only the UN security council could decide. Brummell replied: "The evidence had to be confirmed by someone."

He added: "It came from the prime minister in the name of the British government". The decision flew in the face of all the advice Whitehall lawyers had been giving.

While Downing Street was pressing Goldsmith hard, and eventually successfully, to come round to the view that a UN resolution would not be necessary, Straw was battling it out with his lawyers in the FO. Sir Michael Wood, Downing Street's chief legal adviser, wrote to Straw on 24 January 2003 expressing concern about comments Straw had made to then-US vice president, Dick Cheney, in Washington. Straw told Cheney Britain would "prefer" a second resolution but it would be "OK" if they tried and failed to get one "à la Kosovo".

Wood commented that this was "completely wrong from a legal point of view". He told Straw: "I hope there is no doubt in anyone's mind that, without a further decision of the [UN security] council, and absent extraordinary circumstances of which at present there is no sign, the UK cannot lawfully use force against Iraq to ensure compliance with its security council WMD obligations." In a memo to Straw, Wood added: "To use force without security council authority would amount to a crime of aggression". Straw, now justice secretary, replied: "I note your advice but I do not accept it."

Wood told the inquiry: "He took the view that I was being very dogmatic and that international law was pretty vague and that he wasn't used to people taking such a firm position. When he had been at the Home Office, he had often been advised things were unlawful but he had gone ahead anyway and won in the courts."

Wood said it was "probably the first and only occasion" that a minister rejected his legal advice in this way. "The problem for the government as a whole was they needed advice even if they didn't want it," Wood told the inquiry.